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Jordan J. Paust*
During his so-called "war on terror," President Bush has authorized and
ordered manifest violations of customary and treaty-based international law
concerning the detention, transfer, and interrogation of numerous individuals.
For example, in a February 7, 2002 memorandum, President Bush expressly
authorized the denial of absolute rights and protections contained in the 1949
Geneva Conventions that apply in all circumstances to any person who is
detained during an armed conflict. The President's memo denied rights and
protections under Geneva law
[B]y ordering that humane treatment be provided merely "in a manner
consistent with the principles of Geneva" and then only "to the extent
appropriate and consistent with military necessity," despite the fact
that (1) far more than the "principles" of Geneva law apply, (2) it is
not "appropriate" to deny treatment required by Geneva law, and [it
is well-understood that] (3) alleged military necessity does not justify
the denial of treatment required by Geneva law.'
Necessarily, the President's 2002 memorandum authorized and ordered the
denial of treatment required by the Geneva Conventions and, therefore,
necessarily authorized and ordered violations of the Geneva Conventions-
which are war crimes.2
My new book at Cambridge University Press, BEYOND THE LAW,3
identifies a reported presidential finding (signed in 2002) by President Bush,
Condoleezza Rice, and then-Attorney General John Ashcroft approving
unlawful interrogation techniques-including water boarding, and an authoriza-
tion for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to secretly detain and interrogate
persons in a September 17, 2001 directive known as a memorandum of
notification and that harsh interrogation tactics were devised in late 2001 and
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1. See JORDANJ. PAUST, BEYONDTHE LAw:THEBUSH ADMINISTRATION'S UNLAWFUL RESPONSES
IN THE "WAR" ON TERROR 7-8 (2007) [hereinafter PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW].
2. Every violation of the law of war is a war crime. See, e.g., id. at 13. A uniform and
overwhelming number of federal cases demonstrates that the President and all persons within the executive
branch are bound by the customary and treaty-based laws of war. See, e.g., id. at 21-22, 169-72.
3. PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW, supra note 1.
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early 2002.' Subsequently, the CIA disclosed the existence of a directive
signed by President Bush granting the CIA power to set up secret detention
facilities in foreign territory and outlining interrogation tactics that were
authorized, as well as another document that contains a Department of Justice
legal analysis specifying interrogation methods that the CIA was authorized to
use against top al-Qaeda members.' In fact, during a speech on September 6,
2006, President Bush publicly admitted that a CIA program has been
implemented "to move.. . [high-value] individuals to... where they can be
held in secret" and interrogated using "tough" forms of treatment, and stated
that the CIA program will continue.' In July 2006 and in furtherance of his
program, President Bush had signed a new executive order authorizing
"'enhanced' interrogation tactics to be used against persons held in secret
"'black sites"' overseas and elsewhere.'
As documented in BEYOND THE LAW, the unlawful "tough" interrogation
tactics that are an admitted part of the Bush program are war crimes.' They are
also violations of nonderogable customary and treaty-based human rights law9
and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment."' The transfer of non-prisoners of war out of war-
related occupied territory in Afghanistan and Iraq during the Bush program was
also a patent and per se violation of the laws of war. Such transfers are
absolutely prohibited by express language in Article 49 of the Geneva Civilian
Convention' and clearly and unavoidably constitute "grave breaches" of the
Convention. 2 Moreover, the refusal to disclose the names or whereabouts of
persons subjected to secret transfer and secret detention is a manifest and
serious crime against humanity known as forced disappearance-a crime that
also involves patent violations of related human rights law, the Convention
Against Torture, and the laws of war.'3
4. Id. at 28.
5. Id. at 28-29.
6. Id. at29.
7. See, e.g., Scott Shane, David Johnston & James Risen, Secret US. Endorsement of Severe
Interrogations, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2007, at AI (also disclosing the existence of memos penned by Seven
G. Bradbury in OLC, DOJ). See also Randall Mikkelsen, CIA Detention Program Remains Active: U.S.
Official, REUTERS NEWS, Oct. 4, 2007.
8. See, e.g., PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 1-4. 12-18. 27-31; Appendix, infra.
9. Id. at 4-5, 12-18,27-31.
10. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. See also PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 5.
11. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 49, Aug.
12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention].
12. Geneva Convention, supra note 11, art. 147; PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 18.
13. See PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 32.
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John Yoo, a former Deputy Assistant Attorney General at the Office of
Legal Counsel of the United States Department of Justice, has disclosed that
detention, denial of Geneva protections, and coercive interrogation "policies
were part of a common, unifying approach to the war on terrorism."' 4 During
meetings chaired by White House Counsel Gonzales, the inner circle decided
that following Geneva law would interfere with their "'ability to . . .
interrogate,""'.. since everyone understood that "Geneva bars 'any form of
coercion.""' 6 "For the inner circle, '[t]his became a central issue," 7 and...
they calculated that 'treating the detainees as unlawful combatants would
increase flexibility in detention and interrogation';"8 and the question became
merely 'what interrogation methods fell short of the torture ban and could be
used"9 as 'coercive interrogation,' 20 which includes outlawed cruel, inhuman,
and degrading treatment."'"
In view of the fact that a "common, unifying approach" was devised to use
"coercive interrogation" tactics and President Bush has admitted that such
tactics and secret detention have been used as part of his approved program in
other countries, it is obvious that use of coercive interrogation migrated to
Afghanistan and Iraq as part of the common plan. It is also clear that
presidential and other authorizations, directives, and findings (including two
authorizations from Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld22 and one from Lt. Gen.
Sanchez23) and memos (such as the Yoo-Delahunty,24 Gonzales,25 Aschcroft,26
Bybee,27 Goldsmith,2" and the newer Bradbury memos29), and the 2003
Department of Defense Working Group Report 0 substantially facilitated the
effectuation of the common, unifying plan to use coercive interrogation and that
14. JOHN Yoo, WAR BY OTHER MEANS ix (2006).
15. PAUST, BEYONDTHE LAW, supra note 1, at 30. (citing YOO, supra note 15, at 39).
16. Id. at 30. (citing YOO, supra note 15, at 39).
17. Id. at 30. (citing YOO, supra note 15, at 39).
18. Id. at 30. (citing YOO, supra note 15, at 43).
19. Id. at 30. (citing YOO, supra note 15, at 171).
20. PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 30. (citing YOO, supra note 15, at 191).
21. See, e.g., YOO supra note 14, at 200; PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 30.
22. See, e.g., PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 26.
23. Id. at 16.
24. Id. at 9.
25. Id. at 5.
26. Id. at 7.
27. PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 11.
28. Id. at 18.
29. See Shane, supra note 7, at Al.
30. See PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 14.
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use of unlawful coercive interrogation tactics was either known or a
substantially foreseeable consequence of the common plan. Clearly, several
memo writers and those who authorized coercive interrogation tactics were
aware that their memos and authorizations would assist perpetrators of coercive
interrogation.
What types of criminal responsibility can exist under international law
with respect to such conduct? First, it is obvious that direct perpetrators of
violations of the laws of war, the Convention Against Torture, and crimes
against humanity (such as forced disappearance of persons as part of the
President's "program" of secret detention) have direct liability. Leaders who
issue orders or authorizations to commit international crimes can also be
prosecuted as direct perpetrators.31
Second, any person who aids and abets an international crime has liability
as a complicitor or aider and abettor before the fact, during the fact, or after the
fact.32 Liability exists whether or not the person knows that his or her conduct
is criminal.33 Under customary international law, a complicitor or aider and
abettor need only be aware that his or her conduct would or does assist a direct
perpetrator.34 In any case, ignorance of the law is no excuse. Especially
relevant in this respect are the criminal memoranda and behavior of various
German lawyers in the German Ministry of Justice, high level executive
positions outside the Ministry, and the courts in the 1930s and 1940s that were
addressed in informing detail in United States v. Altstoetter (The Justice
Case).35 Clearly, several memo writers in the Bush Administration abetted the
"common, unifying" plan.
Third, individuals can also be prosecuted for participation in a "joint
criminal enterprise,"36 which the International Criminal Tribunal forthe Former
Yugoslavia has recognized can exist in at least two relevant forms: (1) where
all the accused "voluntarily participated in one of the aspects of the common
plan" and "intended the criminal result, [whether or not they knew it was a
31. See, e.g., JORDAN J. PAUST, M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, ETAL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 32,
35, 5 1-73 (3rd ed. 2007) [hereinafter PAUST, ICL].
32. Id. at 47 (citing Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. IT-95-14/I-T, Trial Chamber, 545 (Sept.
2, 1998); PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW, supra note I, at 18, 24, 30.
33. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 25(3)(c)-(d), 30, 32(2), July 17,
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
34. See Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/I-T, Trial Chamber, IM 236-38, 245, 249
(Dec. 10, 1998); But see Rome Statute, supra note 33, art. 25(3)(c) (adding a new "purpose" to facilitate the
test that will leave ICC jurisdiction incomplete).
35. See United States v. Altstoetter, 4 Law Reports ofTrials ofWar Criminals Case No. 35, 1 (U.N.
War Crimes Comm'n, 1948).
36. PAUST, ICL, supra note 31, at 32, 37-38.
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crime] even if not physically perpetrating the crime"37 ; and (2) where "(i) the
crime charged was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the execution of
that enterprise, and (ii) the accused was aware that such a crime was a possible
consequence of the execution of that enterprise, and, with that awareness
participated in that enterprise."3
Fourth, civilian and military leaders can also be liable for dereliction of
duty with respect to acts of subordinates when the leader:
1) Knew or should have known that subordinates were about to
commit, were committing, or had committed international
crimes;
2) The leader had an opportunity to act; and
3) The leader failed to take reasonable corrective action, such as
ordering a halt to criminal activity or initiating a process for
prosecution of all subordinates reasonably accused of criminal
conduct.39
What legislation allows prosecution of some of these crimes? In the
United States, there are several forms of legislation that can be used. However,
there is presently no federal statute permitting prosecution of "crimes against
humanity" as such, although one could be enacted and operate retroactively
without violating any ex post facto prohibitions as long as what is being
prosecuted under the new statute was a crime against humanity under
international law at the time of the alleged commission.4"
Prosecution in the federal district courts would most likely occur under
two forms of federal legislation that allow prosecution of relevant war crimes.
The first is the War Crimes Act.4 This statute allows prosecution, for example,
of those U.S. nationals who commit a relevant war crime outside the United
States. Listed war crimes include some violations of the 1907 Hague
Convention No. IV42 and all "grave breaches" of the Geneva Conventions43
(which include certain forms of mistreatment of detainees and the unlawful
transfer of persons).' Also clearly relevant is the statutory listing of violations
37. Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Trial Chamber, 264 (Sept. 1, 2004).
38. Id. 265; Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T-A, Appeals Chamber, 50 (July 29,
2004)
39. See, PAUST, ICL, supra note 31, at 51-73; PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 52, 70.
40. See, e.g., PAUST, ICL, supra note 31, at 234, 236.
41. 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2003).
42. 18 U.S.C. § 244 1(c)(2) (2003).
43. 18 U.S.C. § 2441(c)(1) (2003).
44. See, Geneva Convention, supra note 11, art. 147.
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of common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions,45 which expressly
requires humane treatment of detained persons "in all circumstances" and also
covers "violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation,
cruel treatment and torture" as well as "outrages upon personal dignity, in
particular humiliating and degrading treatment" of "persons taking no active
part in the hostilities."46 Today, customary international law reflected in
common Article 3 provides a set of minimum rights and duties in any armed
conflict, although the article was originally designed to apply to cases of
insurgency.47 The Supreme Court's opinion in Hamdan48 and the concurring
opinion of Justice Kennedy, 49 generally affirm this point about Geneva law-a
point documented further in BEYOND THE LAW.5"
A second set of federal laws allows prosecution in federal district courts
of any violation of the laws of war as offenses against the laws of the United
States. As recognized by the Supreme Court in cases such as Exparte Quirin5
and In re Yamashita,52 the precursor to 10 U.S.C. § 818 incorporated the laws
of war by references as offenses against the laws of the United States. Under
18 U.S.C. § 3231, all offenses against the laws of the United States can be
prosecuted in the federal district courts, whether or not there is concurrent
jurisdiction in any military tribunal. These points have been well documented
45. See 18 U.S.C. § 2441(c)(3) (2003).
46. Geneva Convention, supra note 1I, art. 3.
47. See, e.g., PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW, supra note I, at 2-3.
48. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 Sup.Ct. 2749, 2749 (2006) (the Court ruled that "there is at least
one provision of the Geneva Conventions that applies here... Common Article 3").
49. See id. at 2799-804 (Kennedy, J. concurring)
[T]he requirement of the Geneva Conventions... [is] a requirement that controls here
... The Court is correct to concentrate on one provision of the law of war that is
applicable to our Nation's armed conflict with al Qaeda in Afghanistan ... That
provision is Common Article 3 ... The provision is part of a treaty the United States
has ratified and thus accepted as binding law.... By Act of Congress, moreover,
violations of Common Article 3 are considered 'war crimes,' punishable as federal
offenses.
Id.
50. See, e.g., PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 3.
51. 317 U.S. 1, 28, 30 (1942) ("Congress... exercised its authority to define and punish offenses
against the law of nations ... Congress has incorporated by reference... all offenses which are defined as
such by the law of war").
52. 327 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1946).
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in another article. 3 Additionally, prosecution of some forms of torture could
occur under the federal torture statute.54
It would also be possible to prosecute civilians in a properly constituted
military commission in a war related occupied territory using at least the
minimum due process requirements under customary international law
incorporated by reference in common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions55
and reflected in Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights.56 Prosecution of civilians might also be possible in a general courts-
martial in a theater of war in time of war if such a prosecution can survive a
Fifth Amendment challenge such as that addressed in the Supreme Court's 1957
decision in Reid v. Covert 7 (which might be distinguished, since the case
addressed the impropriety of military tribunal jurisdiction over U.S. civilians
in time of peace). Prosecution of some persons is also possible under the
Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act,58 which applies extraterritorially to
"whoever engages in conduct outside the United States" that would be conduct
criminally proscribed had the conduct been engaged "within the special
maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States," but the conduct of a
person who is not a member of the armed forces of the United States would
have to have been engaged in while that person was (1) "employed by" US
armed forces,59 or (2) "accompanying" U.S. armed forces outside the United
States.60
A significant problem today, however, is the fact that the Bush
Administration is unwilling to prosecute "their own" under any relevant statute
and experts expect that the new Attorney General will not attempt to enforce
relevant criminal law.6" As documented in BEYOND THE LAW, "for more than
five years the Bush Administration has furthered a general policy of impunity
53. Jordan J. Paust, After My Lai: The Case for War Crime Jurisdiction Over Civilians in Federal
District Courts, 50 TEX. L. REv. 6, 10-23,27 (1971), reprinted in 4 THE VIETNAM WARAND INTERNATIONAL
LAW 447 (1976).
54. 18 U.S.C. § 2340-2340A (2000).
55. Geneva Convention, supra note 11, art. 3.
56. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 14, Dec. 16,1966,999U.N.T.S. 171;
See also PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 105.
57. 354 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1957).
58. 18 U.S.C. § 3261 (2000).
59. 18 U.S.C. § 326 1(a)(1) (2000).
60. Id.
61. See, e.g. Anthony D'Amato, Waterboarding: The Key Question for Mukasey, THE JURIST,
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2007/10/waterboarding-key-question-for-mukasey.php (last visited Feb. 15,
2008); Benjamin Davis, Mukasey on Torture: Of Sins, Mistakes and Crimes, THE JURIST,
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/fonny/2007/10/mukasey-on-torture-of-sins-mistakes-and.php (last visited Feb. 15,
2008).
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by refusing to prosecute any person of any nationality under the War Crimes
Act or alternative legislation, the torture statute, genocide legislation, and
legislation permitting prosecution of certain civilians employed by or
accompanying U.S. military forces abroad."62 For example, the Administration
refuses to prosecute memo-writers who have abetted what President Bush
admitted in September 2006 is his "program" of (1) secret detention or forced
disappearance and the per se war crime and "grave breach" of Geneva law
involving the transfer of persons out of occupied territory, and (2) "tough"
interrogation tactics (which are violative of several treaties of the United States
and customary international laws, as documented most recently in BEYOND THE
LAW),63 and those who authorized such criminal activity during what has been
described as a "common, unifying" plan devised by the "inner circle" to engage
in what are patently unlawful forms of "coercive interrogation." Only a few of
the direct perpetrators of the common plan have been prosecuted in military
fora and penalties have generally been surprisingly lenient.
Finally, in the long history of the United States, the Bush Administration
is unique. President Bush and others have clearly authorized and abetted
various types of serious and manifest international crime and the Administra-
tion refuses (1) to stop the violations, and (2) to initiate prosecution of all who
are reasonably accused. We who are still free to speak out must continue our
efforts to assure that no President, Vice President, or cabal of politically-
appointed lawyers ever initiate, authorize, engage in, and abet such a common
plan and program again. The very soul of America, the rule of law, and our
common humanity are at stake.
62. PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 31-32.




Sixteen "Tough," "Coercive" Tactics Authorized for Interrogation
[and Categories of International Legal Proscription]' 4
1. Water-boarding [terror, torture, cruel, inhuman, physical coercion];
2. Use of dogs to intimidate [terror, torture, cruel, inhuman, threats of
violence, moral coercion];
3. Threatening to kill family members [terror, torture, cruel, inhuman, threats
of violence moral coercion];
4. Cold cell [torture, cruel, inhuman, physical coercion, degrading,
humiliating];
5. Stripping naked [inhuman, degrading, humiliating, moral coercion; (and
in a given culture) cruel, physical coercion];
6. "Fear up harsh" [cruel, inhuman, physical coercion, moral coercion];
7. Striking to cause pain and fear [cruel, inhuman, physical coercion, moral
coercion];
8. Severe stress matrix, including short shackling [cruel, inhuman, physical
coercion];
9. Withholding of pain medication [cruel, inhuman, physical coercion];
10. Prolonged deprivation of sleep [cruel, inhuman, physical coercion];
11. Secret detention [forced disappearance, cruel, inhuman];
12. Threat of transfer to country for torture [cruel, inhuman, threats of
violence, moral coercion; (and in a given case) terror, torture];
13. Transfer from occupied territory [unlawful transfer, grave breach];
14. Hooding to cause fear [inhuman, moral coercion -- exacerbated when used
with stripping naked and/or hooding to include other categories of
illegality];
15. Sexual humiliation [inhuman, degrading, humiliating, moral coercion],
and;
16. Withholding of food [inhuman, physical coercion].
64. See generally PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW, supra note 1.
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